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This paper  first develops  a simple search model of  the  fhm  seeking to choose  a new  CEO by 
using  the  promotion  tournament.  We then use the  model  to  derive  two empirical  hypotheses 
concerning  the duration of the tournament and its relationships  to fkm size and observable signals 
of the contenders’  ability  such as educational credentials.  These hypotheses are tested by using 
unique micro data on recently completed tournaments of 695 leading corporations in the U.S. and 
819 leading  corporations  in Japan.  Further, the comparative  nature of the data set allows us to 
contrast  the  relevance  of  the search model  between  the two nations.  The  estimates  from  our 
preferred  specifications  of a Weibull duration model provide evidence for the hypotheses in both 
the  U.S.  and  Japan.  Specifically,  (i)  larger  firms  are  more  likely  to  prolong  the  promotion 
tournament;  (ii) when CEO contenders have less outside  experience, the fkn  is more  likely  to 
prolong  the tournament;  and (iii)  when  CEO contenders  are not  college  graduates,  the  firm  is 
more  likely  to  prolong  the  tournament.  Furthermore,  contrary  to  the  popular  view,  CEO 
contenders  having  strong college credentials (e.g., graduating  from the University  of Tokyo)  do 
not significantly  alter the fixm’s optimal stopping mle of the tournament in Japan, whereas, strong 
credentials  do matter in the U.S. 1 
THE  TIMING  OF  PROMOTION  TO  TOP  MANAGEMENT 
IN  THE  U.S. AND JAPAN:  A Duration Analysis 
I. Introduction 
We develop  a simple search model  of the firm  seeking to select its new CEO by using 
the  promotion  tournament.  We  then  use  the  model  to  derive  two  empirical  hypotheses 
concerning the duration of the tournament and its relationships  to f7r-m  size and observable  signals 
of the contenders’  ability  such as educational  credentials.  These hypotheses  are tested by using 
unique  micro  data  containing  information  on  recently  completed  tournaments  of  695  leading 
corporations  in the U.S. and 819 leading  corporations  in Japan. 
The  paper  makes  three  distinct  contributions.  For  the  first  time,  we analyze  the  CEO 
promotion  tournament  in .the U.S. and Japan using a duration  model.’  Second,  we generalize 
the Weibull hazard so that the regressors need not have the same proportional  effect at all dates. 
A  likelihood  ratio  statistic  is  then  applied  to  determine  whether  the  proportional  hazard  is 
appropriate.  Third, on our reading of the literature, the paper represents one of the first attempts 
to model  the tournament  in the search theoretic  i?amework.2 
Our findings are of particular relevance concerning the Japanese economy.  While diverse 
theories  as  to  the  determinants  of  the  postwar  success of  the  Japanese  economy  have  been 
advanced,  the  matter  remains  controversial  with  competing  views  of  alleged  unique  human 
‘In  the  last  few  years  we have  witnessed  a rather  impressive  emergence  of  econometric 
studies of  top management  compensation  and turnover  in Japan such as Anderson,  Jayaraman, 
and Mandelker  (1993), Ang  and Constand (I 993), Kaplan  (1992), Kaplan  and Minton  (1993), 
Kato  and  Rockel  (1992),  and  Merck  and  Nakamura  (1992).  However,  the  focus  of  these 
studies  has  been  on  the  incentive  structure  of  top  management  compensation  and  turnover, 
and the  influence  of main  banks and other firms  in the  same corporate  group.  None  of  these 
studies has examined promotion  tournaments  in Japanese firms. 
‘A notable  e  xce  p  tion is O’Flaherty  and Siow (1992). 2 
resource  management  practices,  superior  industrial  policy,  and innovative  production  methods. 
Recently  Koike (1991) stresses the positive role played by the promotion policy  of Japanese fimrs 
in  accounting  for  their  competitiveness.  He  argues  that  Japanese  firms  tend  to  prolong  the 
promotion  tournament  longer  than U.S. firms, resulting  in more competition  among  employees 
and more  accumulation  of firm-specific  human  capital. 
We contribute  to this important  controversy  by providing  the first rigorous  econometric 
and comparative  evidence on the promotion policy  of top management.  As emphasized by Koike 
(1991), we find that Japanese firms do tend to prolong  the promotion  tournament  relative  to U.S. 
firms.  Furthermore,  our  search  model  of  the  tournament  suggests that  the  difference  in  the 
promotion  policy  between  the two nations may be caused by the difference  in: (i) time discount 
rates; (ii) incentive  effects of the promotion  tournament;  and (iii)  adjustment  costs of replacing 
the incumbent  CEOs. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we develop a simple search model 
of  the promotion  tournament,  which  wilI be used to guide  our empirical  analysis.  Sections  III 
and IV derive two empirically  testable hypotheses,  while section V provides  the basic empirical 
strategy  and  describes  the  data.  In  section  VI  we present  our main  empirical  results,  and  we 
follow  with  concluding  remarks. 
Consider  the  firm  seeking  to  choose  its new  CEO by  using  the promotion  toumament.3 
The  firm  acquires  additional  information  on the ability  of  each contender  by  observing  him  in 
“For the  promotion  tournament  in  general,  see Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1992;  chapter  11) 
for  instance.  For  recent  applications  of  the  idea  of  the  promotion  tournament  to  Japanese 
promotion  policy,  see Itoh  (1991) and Prendergast (1992). 3 
his  current job,  and  the  tournament  ends  when  the  firm  names  the  winner  and  replaces  the 
incumbent  CEO.  A firms  decision on when to end the tournament  can be modelled  in a simple 
search theoretic  framework4.  Assume that the ability  of each contender  is revealed  to the  firm 
at rate 6.  Thus, the probability  that one contender’s ability  is revealed to the firm within  a short 
interval  of  length  h is 6h.’  The parameter  6 is the arrival rate of information  on the ability  of 
CEO contenders.  We summariz  e the ability of a contender by the profit,  II, of the firm under his 
leadership  as CEO.  Successive revelations  of  the ability  of  contenders  over  the  course  of  the 
tournament  are drawn from a known distribution  with finite mean p and variance  v, cumulative 
function F(z),  and density  f(x). 
Assume that the firm maximizes the expected present value of profit  flow, discounted  to 
the present  over  an infinite  horizon  at rate r.  The  ending  of  the tournament  will  entail  costs. 
First, as stressed in the tournament literature,  since contenders are fully aware that the firm seeks 
to learn their  ability  by observing their performance  on current jobs,  the promotion  tournament 
provides positive  incentive  effects on contenders.  The termination  of the tournament  will forego 
these  positive  incentive  effects6  Second,  the  conclusion  of  the  tournament  will  lead  to 
replacement  of  the  incumbent  CEO,  which  may  entail  some  adjustment  costs  such  as  costly 
reorganization  of internal  organizations.  Denote the cost of ending the tournament  by c. 
If the firm ends the tournament, the firm  will earn the discounted present value  of profit 
under the new leadership  net of the cost of the tournament  termination  over  an infinite 
4For a  thorough  literature  review  on  the  search  approach  in  labor  economics,  see Devine 
and Kiefer  (1991)  for instance. 
‘We  are  making  a  simplifying  assumption  that  no  more  than  one  contender’s  ability  is 
revealed  in the interval  h.  The assumption  is innocuous. 
6A similar  point  is made by Itoh (199 1) and Prendergast (1992). 4 
horizon.  That is, 
uyx)=y  (1) 
Alternatively,  if the firm  decides not to end the tournament,  the f%m will  earn instead: 
’  U”=_  bh+  lib  ~~Jm~(WO,Wl+(l  -sh)-$-$J” 
l+rh  + 
(2) 
where b is the profit  under  the incumbent  CEO.  The first term is the discounted  present value 
of the profit under the incumbent  CEO over the interval  h.  Over the next interval,  two mutually 
exclusive  events may occur;  (i) the value of x is revealed  with probability  6h;  and (ii) the value 
of  n: is not revealed  with probability  (l-6h).  In the first event,  the firm will  earn the expected 
discounted  present value  of following  the optimal policy  if x is revealed, whereas, in the second 
event the lirm  will  earn the discounted present value  of continuing  the tournament. 
Since UC(X)  is monotonically  increasing  in rt and u”  does not depend on revealed  value 
of  IL, one  can  solve  for  a  minimum  level  of  rr (reservation  profit  II*) at  which  the  firm  is 
indifferent  between  ending  and continuing  the tournament.  That  is, 
Uyn’)=q_P  (3) 
The firm’s optimal  policy  is to end the tournament  when n: 2 x*.  From Eq. (3), one can obtain 




(TC’ b-c)r=(E,[n  1  rr&r*]-~*)[l -F(rr*)]6  (5) 
The left-hand  side represents the marginal  cost of not ending the tournament  when the revealed 
ability  of  the  contender  is equal  to  x1, or  the  imputed  interest  income  flow  on  the  difference 
between  profit  under  his leadership  as CEO  and profit  under  the  leadership  of  the  incumbent 
CEO net of c.  The right-hand  side is the marginal  benefit  of not ending  the tournament.  That 
is, it is the marginal  expected gain  in future profit  from not  ending the tournament,  given  that 
the  tournament  will  be ended  only  when  the  revealed  ability  of the  contender,  II, exceeds  5c’, 
multiplied  by  the  probability  that  such value  of  5c is revealed.  Comparative  static  results  in 
parallel  to the  search model  of unemployment  can be obtained  from this  optimality  condition. 
Particularly,  increases  in b, c, 6, or u will result in an increase in the reservation  profit.  On the 
other hand,  an increase in r will lead to a decrease in the reservation profit.’ 
Let E denote  the probability  that the  firm will  end the tournament  in a short  interval  of 
length h.  Denote by n the conditional  probability  that once a contender’s ability  (x) is revealed, 
the firm will  end the tournament  by naming  him the CEO.  The fitm  will name him the winner 
insofar  as x exceeds its reservation  level,  7c*. Thus, 
(6) 
Since E is the product  of rt  (z*)  and the probability  that x is revealed to the  firm within  a short 
interval  of length  h, 
E=6h q(d)  (7) 
Dividing  through  by h yields the instantaneous  rate of ending the tournament,  namely  the hazard: 
2,’ 
‘Derivations  of these results and other unreported  results are available  upon request. 6 
B=bq(zc’)  (8) 
Using  Eq.  (8)  and  Eq.  (4),  again  one  can  obtain  comparative  statics  results  in  close 
analogy  to those in the search model  of unemployment.  Specifically,  an increase  in b or c will 
lead to  a decrease  in  the hazard rate  whereas  an increase  in r will  result  in  an increase  in  the 
hazard rate. 
III. Firm Size and Hazard 
By  using  the  above  search  model,  one  can  develop  an  empirically  testable  hypothesis 
between  firm  size and  the hazard  rate.  First, one  can argue (ceteris paribus)  that  the  cost of 
ending  the  tournament,  c, is greater  for  larger  firms.  The  reasoning  is that positive  incentive 
effects  of  the promotion  tournament  are less relevant  for smaller  firms  since direct  monitoring 
(as  opposed  to  indirect  incentive  devices  such  as  the  promotion  tournament  and  deferred 
payments)  may  be more  feasible  for these fitms8  The termination  of the tournament  may  not 
forego  much of the incentive  effects  for those smaller firms.  The replacement  of the  CEO can 
also be carried  out more  smoothly  in  smaller firms where the internal  organization  of  the  firm 
is less complex  and less hierarchical. 
Moreover,  for Japanese firms, recent theoretical  contributions  in the literature of Japanese 
corporate  governance  suggest that the system of financial  corporate grouping  (that is, grouping 
of firms linked by their relationships  to a main bank and by cross-holding of equity)  allows large 
Japanese  firms to be relatively  free from  pressure from individual  shareholders  who are mostly 
interested  in  short-term  returns.  It  follows  that  large  Japanese  firms  affiliated  with  financial 
‘Similar  arguments  are developed  for  the  incentive  effects  of  profit  sharing  by  Cable  and 
Wilson  (1990)  and &use  (1993). 7 
corporate  groups are more  likely  to pursue longer-term  goals,  thereby  having  a lower  discount 
rate, r.’  Since larger c and lower r  results  in a lower hazard 
one  can predict, 
rate (as shown in the prior  section), 
H,  (Firm Size and Hazard):  the hazard will fall as fum  size rises. 
IV. SiPnals and Hazard 
While  a strict interpretation  of our model  implies random  search, it is clear that  firms  will 
most likely  use some observable  signals to decide which employees to include  in the promotion 
toumament.*o  For example,  educational  qualifications  and prior  work experience  may be used 
to identify  suitable  candidates.  Indeed, the firm may assume correctly  that those with  stronger 
credentials  and/or previous  work experience will tend to be in the right-hand  tail of f(x).  Since 
the firm knows who has stronger  credentials and greater prior experience,  it will be optimal  for 
the firm to closely monitor  the progress of these talented individuals.  In other words, when one 
has  a  sample  of  tournament  winners  with  varying  educational  credentials  and  prior  work 
experience, 
H, (Signals and hazard): stronger educational credentials and greater prior experience wiIl 
result in higher hazards.” 
vor  Japanese corporate  groups, see Aoki  (1988; chapter 4) for instance. 
“On  the  issue  of  systematic  versus  random  search,  see  for  instance  Salop  (1973)  and 
Kahn  and Low (1988). 
‘IOne can  envision  a  more  general  model  in  which  the  firm’s  decision  is  made  in  two 
stages.  First, as modelled  in the paper, given  observable  signals, the firm decides  the optimal 
promotion  policy.  Second,  given  the  optimal  promotion  policy,  the  firm  selects  the  optimal 
pool  of  CEO  promotion  contenders  in  terms  of  their  observable  signals  such  as  educational 
credentials  and experiences  by balancing  the cost and benefit  of  selecting  the pool  with  strong 
signals.  One can view  our  analysis  in  the paper  as a study of  the optimal  promotion  policy, 
given  the pool  of optimally  chosen contenders. 8 
V. Data and Empirical  Strategy 
The Business Week CEO 1000 Special Issue (October 23,  1987) provides  information 
on the most recently  completed  CEO promotional  tournament  of  1,000 leading  corporations  in 
the U.S., which were selected on the basis of their market equity values  (share price multiplied 
by number of shares outstanding)  as of stock-market close, September 11,1987.  The information 
includes detailed personal  characteristics  of winners of the most recently  completed  tournaments 
(or  the  current  CEOs)  such  as educational  credentials,  experience  prior  to joining  the present 
firm,  experience  within  the  present  firm  prior  to  winning  the  promotion  tournament,  and 
experience  after winning  the tournament.  Merging the data with the usual accounting  data that 
we  assembled  from  Moody’s  and  Standard  and  Poor’s,  and  eliminating  observations  with 
missing  data  and  those  firms  that  chose  the  current  CEO @  by  the  promotion  tournament,‘2 
we  created  a data  base  containing  information  of  695 leading  U.S.  corporations  on  the  most 
recently  completed  CEO promotional  toumament  and various  company  characteristics. 
To create a comparable  data set for Japan, we began calculating  the market  equity value 
of  all  Japanese  companies  listed  on  Japan’s  eight  Stock  Exchanges  (there  were  nearly  2,000 
companies  listed in  1986), multiplying  share price as of  stock-market  close,  July  3 1, 1986, by 
number  of shares outstanding  as of August  1, 1986.  Data on share prices  were taken  from the 
Weekly  Toyo  Keizai  1987 KABUKA SOR4N  Special Issue (February  6,  1987), and data on 
number  of shares outstanding  were taken from the Fall  1986 KAISHA  SHIKJ  HO, published 
by  the  Oriental  Economist.  Based on these calculations,  we selected  the  1,000 most valuable 
Japanese companies,  and compiled biographical  data on their current chief executives (shacho or 
12We  consider  “not by  promotion  tournament”  those  firms  that  chose  the  current  CEO by 
having  the  firm  fo&d  by  the  CEO or  by bringing  in  an outsider  as CEO.  In  either  case, 
the tournament  duration  is zero. 9 
todori)13,  or winners of the most recently  completed CEO tournaments,  from the 1987  KAISHA 
SHOKUIN  ROKU  (published by the Diamond) and 
by  the  Oriental  Economist).  The  resulting  data 
accounting  data  that  we collected  from the  Weekly 
the 1987 YAKUIN  SHIKI  HO  (published 
were  further  merged  with  the  corporate 
Toyo  Keizai  KABUKA  SORAN  Special 
Issue  (February  6,  1987),  the  Fall  1986  KAISHA  SHIKI  HO  (published  by  the  Oriental 
Economist),  and  a  computer  tape  DATA  MAX  prepared  by  the  Oriental  Economist.  After 
eliminating  observations  with missing  data and founders and external recruits, our final  sample 
contains  8 19 observations. 
Our data enable us to model the duration of tournaments  defined as the time between the 
year in which the tournament  winner (or the current CEO) joined  the firm and the year in which 
he was selected  as the CEO.  Deducting  backward  from the  fact that he did indeed  eventually 
become  the  CEO, we assume that  the  tournament  resulting  in  selecting  him  must  have  begun 
when he joined  the firm_14 
For this purpose,  we specify  the hazard function  as Weibull,  such that, 
e(f)  =aA”t  ‘-I  (9) 
where the hazard,  e(t),  is time  dependent  unless a=l,  in which  case we have the  Exponential 
model  (see  Lancaster,  1990: 36).  Moreover,  we  can  allow  for  a  heteroskedastic  hazard  by 
allowing  a  and/or  1  to  depend  on  time-invariant  regressors.  To  date,  almost  all  empirical 
13Japanese banks  call  their  chief  executives  “todori”  whereas  other  Japanese  companies 
call them  “shacho”. 
“This  assumption  is  clearly  consistent  with  institutional  accounts  of  the  Japanese 
promotion  policy  that  employees  are formally  and informally  categorized  by the year  in  which 
they joined  the  firm  and  are  subject  to  the  same promotion  process  (See,  for  instance,  Itoh, 
199  1 and Prendergast,  1992).  Note  that the assumption  is not valid  for  founders  and  external 
recruits  that are excluded  from the data. 10 
applications  that use the heteroskedastic  Weibull hazard have allowed A (but not a) to vary with 
the  explanatory  variables.  The  implication  of this specification  is that the proportionate  effect 
of  each of the regressors on the hazard is the same regardless of the value  of t.  In  this paper, 
we test the latter specification  by allowing  both a and A.  to depend upon regressors, and then we 
test whether  a  is homoskedastic.  If  so, then we determine  whether the  Exponential  reduction, 
a= 1, appears valid.” 
To  test the  first hypothesis  concerning  the relationship  between rirm size and hazard, we 
consider three alternative  size variables: total sales (SALE), number of employees (EMPLOYEE), 
and market value of the firm (VALUE).  As shown in Table I, the average firm in our US sample 
is significantly  larger  than  the  average firm in our Japanese sample.  In fact, the average US firm 
employs  about  five times more employees  than the average Japanese firm. 
For the  second hypothesis  concerning  signals and hazard, the data allow  us to  consider 
several variables.  First,  we create a dummy  variable,  NO COLLEGE,  that  equals unity  if  the 
winner  of the tournament  holds no college  degree and zero otherwise.  Not too surprisingly,  as 
shown  in Table  I, nearly  all winners  in both nations  are college  graduates  (95.2 percent  of the 
winners  in the Japanese sample and 96.7 percent  in the U.S. sample).  This  suggests that  what 
makes the difference  among those CEO tournament contenders may not be whether they attended 
college,  but rather which  college they attended.  To capture this aspect of educational  credential 
“It  is quite  plausible  that the  incentive  effects  of  the tournament,  c will  diminish  as  the 
tournament  progresses,  or  c=c(t):  c’c  0.  As  the  tournament  progresses,  the  size  of  the 
contender  pool  may  decrease  because a contender  whose  ability  is revealed  to the  firm  and is 
not  chosen  to  be  the  winner  will  exit  from  the  tournament.  The  incentive  effects  of  the 
tournament  will  apply  only  to those who are still  in the tournament.  Second,  the productivity 
of the incumbent  CEO may well decline  as time goes by due to the depreciation  of his human 
capital,  or b=b(t);  b’< 0.  Since it has been  shown that the hazard  is a decreasing  function  of 
c and b, it  follows  that  increasing  hazard  (or positive  duration  dependence)  is likely.  In  fact, 
that is what we find. 11 
signal, we create a dummy  variable,  TOKYO (HARVARD for the U.S. sample),  that  equals to 
unity  if  the  winner  of  the  tour&rent  holds  a  college  degree  from  the  University  of  Tokyo 
(Harvard University  for the U.S. sample), and zero otherwise.  As shown in Table  I, 26.3 % of 
all winners  in the Japanese sample received their highest degrees from the University  of Tokyo, 
while  13.1% in the U.S. sample received their highest degrees from Harvard.  Furthermore,  the 
data enable us to create for the Japanese sample two additional dummy variables -  ECOBUS and 
ENGINEER  -  where  ECOBUS (ENGINEER)  equals to unity  if the winner  of the tournament 
holds a degree in Economics and/or business (in engineering), zero otherwise.  Likewise,  the data 
allow us to create for the U.S. sample an additional  dummy variable,  MBA, that equals to unity 
if  the  winner  hoIds  a degree  of  MBA, zero otherwise.  Finally,  for prior  experience,  the  data 
enable  us  to  calculate  the  number  of  years  spent  after  finishing  an undergraduate  degree  (or 
completing  high  school  for  those  without  college  degrees)  and  before  joining  the  present 
company  (PRIOR EXP). 
Where possible,  we employ  a simple difference-in-means  test to determine  whether  the 
average value  of a given variable  in Japan is equal to that in the U.S.  As is almost  self-evident 
from a casual  reading  of Table I, we reject  the null  hypothesis  of  equality  in most  cases.  For 
example, the average age at promotion  is statistically  different (and, in fact, higher)  in Japan than 
in the U.S.  One notable  exception  to the rule, however,  is prior  experience.  We do not reject 
the null hypothesis  (at the  10% significance  level) that the average prior experience  of Japanese 
contenders  is equal to the average prior  experience  of U.S. contenders.  While  it is tempting  to 
conclude  from this finding  that Japanese and American  firms equahy  value years of experience 
outside  the  firm,  the  duration  results presented  in  the next  section  lead to  a different  point  of 
view. 12 
VI. Empirical  Results 
Our duration  analysis  begins  with nonparametric  estimation  of the hazard  functions  for 
the  U.S.  and  Japan.  We  first  estimated  the  survival  curves  (without  regressors)  by  using 
LIMDEP  (1989).  The  nonparametric  point  estimates  of  the  hazards  at various  durations  are 
summarized  in  Figure  I.  We  immediately  see that  the  hazards  in  both  Japan  and  the  U.S. 
generally  increase  with  duration,  thereby  indicating  that  the  Weibull  distribution  (with  a 
monotonic  hazard  function)  might  be  appropriate.  As  expected,  the  nonparametric  z-test 
proposed by Mudambi and Taylor  (1991,  eq. 3) has realized values of 22.24 and 2 1.3  1 for Japan 
and the U.S., respectively,  and we therefore reject constant transition probabilities  at conventional 
levels  of  significance.  Indeed,  our  search  model  suggests  that  while  firms  will  prolong 
tournaments  up to a point  to enhance work effort and to reap quasi-rents from prior  investments 
in  the  incumbent  CEO,  eventually  they  must announce  a new  winner.  The  implication  is for 
eventual  positive  duration  dependence.  We also note that the hazard rates are generally  higher 
in the U.S. than in Japan at any given  duration,  which  concurs with our prior 
Because  there  is  no  censoring  of  our  data,  we  are  able  to  formulate 
Weibull  model  in linear  form  (see Lancaster,  1990: 35), 
expectation. 
our  (parametric) 
where  T  is  the  completed  duration  and  exp(U)  follows  the  exponential  distribution.  As  is 
typically  the case, we specify  I  = exp(-P’X)  so that consistent  estimates of  fl can be obtained 
by using ordinary  least squares (OLS).  Efficient  estimates, however,  are obtained  only by using 
maximum  likelihood  (ML) since the disturbances are non-normal. 
The WeibuIl hazard is said to be heteroskedastic if l-varies  with X; see Lancaster (1990). 13 
However,  it is clear that the above linear  model  will have heteroskedastic  disturbances  if  a  is 
a function  of a set of regressors, Z.  Moreover,  there  appears no a priori  reason  to exclude  the 
possibility  that the  disturbances  are indeed heteroskedastic.  We therefore  initially  specify  that 
a  =  1  /(a  exp(yZ)“)  and  then  test  whether  y=O.  As  discussed  in  the  prior  section, 
homoskedastic  disturbances  (a=&)  imply  that the proportionate  effect of each regressor  on the 
hazard is independent  of duration.  Furthermore,  the constant-hazard  Exponential  model  results 
from the restriction  that a=o=l. 
Our preferred  empirical  model  for the  U.S.  is found in  Table  II,  while  our  results  for 
Japan are found in Table III.‘”  For both countries, we present unrestricted  maximum  likelihood 
estimates  of  13 
goodness-of-fit 
observation  in 
and  y,  as  well  as  those  where  y  is  restricted  to  be  a  vector  of  zeros.  Our 
measure,  ?,  is  constructed  by  first  calculating  the  expected  duration  for  each 
the  sample  [(see  Lancaster  (1990,  p.  37)],  and  then  correlating  the  expected 
duration  with  the observed  duration.  This measure of  fit is completely  analogous  to R* in  the 
classical  linear  regression  model. 
For  the  unrestricted  models,  we  employed  a  general-to-specific  modelling  strategy  to 
determine which variables were important in the regression and skedastic functions  for Japan and 
the U.S., respectively.  Likelihood  ratio tests were used to determine  which variables  could  be 
dropped without  affecting  the validity  of the empirical  model.  Since likelihood  ratio  tests also 
strongly  reject  the  restricted  specification  for  both  the  U.S.  and  Japan,  it  appears  that  the 
proportional  Weibull  model  is inappropriate  for these data.  Rather,  we find  that VALUE  and 
PRIOR  EXP  are  important  variables  for  the  U.S.  skedastic  function  (i.e.,  the  function  that 
16Due  to extreme values,  the variables  VALUE,  (VALUE)*, PRIOR EXP, (PRIOR  EXP)*, 
SALE and (SALE)* have been resealed  in order to condition  the data for maximum  likelihood 
estimation.  Our conclusions  are unchanged by the variable  transformations. describes  movement  in  a),  while  SALE,  EMPLOYEE, 
dominant  variables  in  the  Japanese  skedastic  function.” 
PRIOR  EXP  and  ENGINEER 




EMPLOYEE  each measure the size of the fnm,  and it is easy to believe  that the distribution  of 
(log) durations  around the conditional  mean are different  for smaller firms than for larger firms. 
Furthermore,  we find that the distribution  of durations depends upon years of experience  outside 
the firm.  For both the U.S. and Japan, we find that larger f%ms have smaller dispersion  of’(log) 
durations, and that (ceteris paribus) prior experience of the new CEO leads to greater uncertainty 
as to the end of the promotion  tournament.  Finally,  in Japan we find that it is easier to predict 
the end of the promotion  tournament  for engineers than for others. 
To ensure that our reduced unrestricted  models (in Tables  II and III) are congruent  with 
the data, we constructed residual plots and performed a diagnostic  check on the integrated  hazard 
as described by Lancaster (1990, pp. 308-3 13).  We found an exceptionally  good fit for the U.S., 
and a good fit for Japan once we interacted  the variable  EMPLOYEE with a dummy  to indicate 
whether the tournament  winner had prior experience.‘* Additionally,  an influential  data analysis 
[see Taylor  (1993)] revealed  that those observations  that have a larger  impact  on the estimated 
coefficients  and standard  errors appear to be legitimate.  Conditional  upon the information  set, 
“The  details  of  these  tests  and  other  unreported  regression  results  are  available  from  the 
authors upon  request. 
‘8The dummy  variable  to  indicate  whether  the  tournament  winner  had  prior  experience 
captures  discrete  differences  between  those  who  adhere  strictly  to  the  “lifetime  employment 
ideal  (working  for the  same firm  for the entire working  life)  and the others.  That the  dummy 
variable  is relevant  to  Japan  yet  not  to  the U.S. appears to  be consistent  with  the  importance 
that  Japanese  firms  are  alleged  to  place  on  the  system  of-lifetime  employment,  whereby  the 
firm  provides  its  employees  with  lifetime  employment  security  and  in  tum  employees  offer 
lifetime  commitment  and loyalty  to the firm for the entire  working  life. 15 
our final  model  specifications  thus seem to be quite adequate.19 
The  estimated regression  functions  for the U.S. and Japan are qualitatively  similar.  We 
find,  for example, that larger firms tend to have longer tournaments,  and this coincides  with our 
first  hypothesis  that  the  hazard  will  fall  as the  firm  size rises.  Because  the  coefficients  on 
(VALUE)2 in the U.S. regression  and (SALE)2 in the Japanese regression  are negative,  we see 
that the impact of marginally  increasing  the size of the firm is less for large firms than for small 
firms.  Such an empirical  result is intuitive.  On the other hand,  we find  that the  size variable 
EMPLOYEE  infhrences the Japanese regression function only for those contenders with no prior 
experience.  In this respect, Japanese firms with more employees typically  require that contenders 
with no prior  experience  spend additional  time preparing  for the CEO position. 
Since the converse of duration  time  is the hazard rate, we gain a deeper appreciation  of 
the  importance  of  firm  size  by  graphing  the  hazard  function.  To  do  so,  we  determine  the 
observations  in our U.S. and Japanese samples that fall at the beginning  of the second and fourth 
quartiles  when the firms are ranked according  to size, as measured by VALUE  in the U.S. and 
SALE  in  Japan.  With  VALUE  and  SALE  respectively  set to  these  quartile  values,  we  then 
assume  that  all  categorical  variables  are zero  and that  the new  CEO has no  prior  experience. 
Finally,  for Japan, we assume values for EMPLOYEE that correspond to the firms identified  at 
the beginning  of the second and fourth  quartiles when the ranking is according  to EMPLOYEE. 
In Figure  II, we graph the hazards  for smal1 and large firms.  As expected,  we see that 
large U.S. firms have lower hazards than small U.S. firms.  This corresponds with our notion  that 
positive  incentive  effects  are less relevant  for  smaller  firms  and that  replacing  the  incumbent 
‘we  also  attempted  to  model durations  by  using  a  Weibull  density  with  unobserved 
gamma  heterogeneity,  but the results  were very  unsatisfactory  and  in most  cases the  iteration 
routine  failed  to converge. 16 
CEOs  entails  less  adjustment  cost  for  smaller  firms.  Jn  Japan,  we  see  that  the  hazards  are 
initially  lower for large ti  than for small firms, but the relative positions  reverse at a duration 
of  about  27  years.  While  seemingly  counter-intuitive,  this  result  can  be  explained.  Larger 
Japanese  firms are more inclined  to pursue long term goals  (which implies  a lower hazard),  but 
there is less uncertainty  among larger fhms  (which implies a hazard with greater curvature).  The 
observed  hazards  are as expected  if large  Japanese firms  are more bound  to tradition  and thus 
less  discretionary  than  small  Japanese  firms.  Furthermore,  we  see  that  U.S.  firms  have 
substantially  steeper hazards than Japanese firms after a duration of about  15 years (note that the 
scale of the Japanese  axis is half  that of the U.S.).  As discussed above,  this  is perhaps  due  to 
the  hypothesized  lower  time  discount  rates  and  higher  costs  of  terminating  the  promotion 
tournament  in Japan. 
Our  regression  functions 
tournament  in both  the U.S. and 
also  reveal  that  prior  experience  tends  to  shorten  the  typical 
Japan,  though  our skedastic  functions  indicate  that  it is more 
difficult  to predict tournament  durations for those with greater prior experience.  These regression 
results concur with our second hypothesis  that prior work experience will result in higher hazards 
due to stronger (positive)  signals, while the results from the skedastic function  are also intuitively 
plausible  since the variation  in the quality  of the previous  work environment  can be quite large. 
In  Figure  III,  we plot  the  hazards  for  mid-size  firms  by  using  the  median  values  for 
SALE,  EMPLOYEE  and  VALUE.  We  compare  those  tournament  winners  with  no  prior 
experience  (PRIOR  EXP = 0) versus  those  with  a prior  work  history.  Of those  with  a work 
background,  the average previous  experience is  11 years in the U.S. and  15 years  in Japan.  As 
expected,  we see that  the tournament  winners  with prior  experience  initially  have  substantially 
higher  hazards  than  those  without  work  experience.  As  the  tournament  duration  progresses, 17 
however,  we see that the relative  positions  of these hazards will  switch, reflecting  the  fact that 
there  is less promotion  uncertainty  for those with no experience.  Interestingly,  we see that this 
switch does not occur for the U.S. until  about 43 years, and sometime after 50 years  for Japan. 
Therefore  we  conclude  that  prior  work  experience  is usually  interpreted  as  a  strong  positive 
signal in favor of the tournament  winner.  The gap in the hazard between those with and without 
prior experience is greater for the U.S. than for Japan, supporting a popular notion  that previous 
work experience  is more valuable  in the U.S. than in Japan. 
Except  for  the  industrial  dummies,  all  of  the  other  variables  included  in  our  model 
measure the academic  credentials  of the new CEO.  As predicted by the second hypothesis,  the 
lack of a college  degree  leads to a decrease in the hazard in both  countries,  whereas,  a degree 
from Harvard or having an MBA diploma in the U.S. increases the hazard function.  Surprisingly, 
having  a  degree  from  the  University  of  Tokyo  will  not  significantly  change  the  average 
tournament  duration in Japan.  This result is unexpected since Japanese culture is usually  thought 
to place extreme emphasis on credentials.20 Nor will having  a degree in economics  or business 
influence the hazard function.  Interestingly,  however, having a technical background does appear 
to  prolong  the  promotion  decision,  and  from  the  skedastic  function  we  see that  there  is  less 
uncertainty  about the (longer)  toumament  durations  for engineers.  Such a result  is not  entirely 
surprising since the different job  skills are needed in managerial  as opposed to technical  careers. 
VII. Concluding  Remarks 
The paper began with developing  a simple search model of the firm  seeking to select its 
‘We  note  that  in  the  proportional  Weibull 
unrestricted  Weibull  model),  the  coefficient  on 
supports our a priori view. 
model  (which  was  rejected  in  favor  of  the 
TOKYO  is  negative  and  significant.  This 18 
new CEO by using the promotion  tournament.  The model was then used to guide our empirical 
analysis.  We  derived  and  tested  two  empirical  hypotheses  concerning  the  duration  of  the 
tournament  and  its relationships  to firm  size and observable  signals  of  the  contenders’  ability 
such as educational  credentials.  In summary, our preferred specifications  of the Weibull  duration 
model  for  the  Japanese  and  U.S.  samples  provided  much  evidence  for  both  hypotheses. 
Specifically,  (i) larger firms are more likely  to prolong the promotion  tournament,  (ii) when CEO 
contenders  have  less outside experience,  the f%m is more likely  to prolong  the tournament;  and 
(iii)  when  CEO  contenders  are not  college  graduates,  the  firm  is more  likely  to  prolong  the 
tournament.  Furthermore,  contrary to popular view, we find that strong college  credentials  (such 
as graduating  from the University  of Tokyo)  do not significantly  alter the firm’s optimal  stopping 
rule of the tournament  in Japan, whereas,  they do in the U.S. 
Our results  contribute  to an important  controversy  over the determinants  of the postwar 
success of  the  Japanese  economy  by providing  the first rigorous  econometric  evidence  on  the 
difference  in the promotion  policy  between Japanese and U.S. firms.  Specifically,  our duration 
analysis  supports  Koike’s  recent  hypothesis  that Japanese firms tend to prolong  the promotion 
tournament  longer  than U.S.  firms,  resulting  in more  competition  among  employees  and more 
accumulation  of firm-specific  human  capital  and thus more overall  competitiveness  of Japanese 
firms.  Furthermore,  our search model of the promotion  tournament  suggests that the difference 
in the  promotion  policy  between  the two nations  may be caused by  the  difference  in:  (i) time 
discount  rates;  (ii)  incentive  effects  of  promotion  tournaments;  and  (iii)  adjustment  costs  of 
replacing  the  incumbent  CEOs.” 
*‘One can  use  a  standard  human  capital  theory  to  explain  the  difference  between  the 
Japanese  and  U.S.  promotion  policy.  For  instance,  Kato  (1993)  cites  Kagono,  Nonaka, 
Okumura,  Sakakibara,  Komatsu,  and Sakashita  (1984) reporting  that Japanese  chief  executives 19 
APPENDIX 
This  appendix  contains  the-definition  of variables. 
The  Japanese  Sample 
YEARS IN FIRM BEFORE PROMOTION = years spent in  firm  before  winning  the  tournament 
(or becoming  chief  executive). 
PRESENT  AGE  = age of the tournament  winner  at the end of  1985 (fiscal). 
AGE AT  PROMOTION  = age at the time of winning the tournament. 
PRIOR EXP = years spent afler  receiving  an undergraduate  degree (or high  school diploma  for 
those  without  college  degrees) and before joining  the present fim~ i.  If one receives  an 
undergraduate  degree after joining  the present firm  i, then  it will  be set to zero. 
NO COLLEGE  = 1 if the tournament  winner  holds no college  degree,  0 otherwise. 
TOKYO = 1 if the tournament  winner received his highest degree from the University  of Tokyo, 
0 otherwise. 
ECOBUS  =  1  if  the 
otherwise. 
tournament  winner  holds  a  degree  in  Economics  and/or  Business,  0 
ENGINEER  =  1 if the tournament  winner  holds a degree in engineering,  0 otherwise. 
VALUE  = market  value of the  fhm  at the end of  1985 (fiscal). 
SALE = total  sales revenue in  1985 (fiscal). 
tend  to  place  more  emphasis  on  their  role  of  gathering  and  distributing  information  between 
divisions  and  departments,  and  their  role  of  forming  consensus  between  divisions  and 
departments  than  U.S. chief  executives.  This  suggests that to be a chief  executive  in Japanese 
corporations  may  require  more  firm-specific  information  and  human  capital  than  in  U.S. 
corporations.  Since firm-specific  information  and human  capital  are acquired  through  on-the- 
job  training,  an  individual  will  have  to  have  more  years  of  experience  in  the  firm  when 
becoming  chief  executive  in  Japan  than  in  the  U.S.  The  present  paper  offers  an  alternative 
explanation  from the incentive  perspective. 20 
EMPLOYEE  = number  of employees  at end of  1985 (fiscal). 
IND =  1 if the tournament  winner has no prior  experience  (or PRIOR EXP = 0), 0 otherwise. 
GASE =  1 if the firm’s  industry  designation  is “electricity  and gas (denki  gasu)“, 0 otherwise. 
The  U.S.  Sample 
YEARS lN FlRM BEFORE PROMOTION = years spent in firm before winning  the tournament 
(or becoming  chief  executive). 
PRESENT  AGE = age of the tournament  winner at the end of  1986 (fiscal). 
AGE AT PROMOTION  = age at the time of winning  the tournament. 
PRIOR EXP = years  spent after receiving  an undergraduate  degree (or high  school diploma  for 
those  without  college  degrees)  and before joining  the present  firm.  If one  receives  an 
undergraduate  degree after joining  the present  firm, then it will  be set to zero. 
NO COLLEGE  =  1 if the tournament  winner holds no college  degree,  0 otherwise. 
HARVARD = 1 if the tournament winner received his highest degree from Harvard, 0 otherwise. 
MBA =  1 if the tournament  winner holds  an MBA, 0 otherwise. 
VALUE  = market  value  of the firm at the end of  1986 (fiscal). 
SALE = total  sales revenue  in  1986 (fiscal). 
EMPLOYEE  = number  of employees  at end of  1986 (fiscal). 
CONS =  1 if the firm’s  industry  designation  is “construction  (SIC Division  C),” 0 otherwise. 
GASE =  1 if the firm’s  industry  designation  is “electricity  and gas (SIC 49),” 0 otherwise. 
SERVE = 1 if the firm’s industry designation  is “service (SIC 47 and Division  I),” 0 otherwise. Anderson,  C., N. Jayaraman,  and Mandelker,  G., ‘Top Management  Change and Corporate 
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Mean  55.919 
S.D.  8.8480 
External  Experiences: 
PRIOR EXP 
Mean  9.3321 
S.D.  12.344 























Sample  Size 
23.739  18.354  years 
13.357  10.147 
62.039  55.639  years old 
7.0173  6.7991 
48.924  years old 
6.9050 
4.7619 % 
26.252  % 
35.897  % 
21.856  % 
0.28526  trillion  yen 
0.59185 
0.84738  trillion  yen 
2.8243 
4.6361  thousand 
7.3124 
819 
8.4374  years 
9.1552 
3.3309  % 
13.094 % 
22.302  % 
3.1569  billion dollars 
6.3892 







See  Appendix for definition  of variables. 
Since  Moody's (1987)  provided  us with data  on the number  of employees 
only as of the end of (fiscal)  1986,  there  are but 563 cases  used to 
obtain the summary  statistics  for EMPLOYEES  in the U.S. Table II.  Duration Models for the United States 
UNRESTRICTED WEIBULL  PROPORTIONAL WEIBULL 
___________-____________  ____________________---- 
Variable  Coefficient  T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 















Skedastic Function:  02  exp(y'Z) 
-0.00414  -4.55365  .  .  . 
0.10259  14.89670  .  .  . 
0.23868  22.38459  0.41417 
Regression Function:  B'X 
3.33085  187.33873  3.31256 
0.00129  10.73929  0.00137 
-0.04028  -7.65219  -0.05289 
-0.07112  -1.79161  -0.08834 
0.32832  4.54046  0.52165 
-0.06846  -2.24372  -0.08991 
0.27733  1.64712  0.26746 
0.07242  1.87612  0.03297 
-0.26211  -4.04514  -0.26492 
-0.00131  -4.73871  -0.00144 
-0.09354  -1.98115  0.00514 
.  .  . 













r2  0.63  0.61 
Log 
Likelihood  -367.58  -508.40 
___~_~_______~______~~~~~~~~~~_~~__~_~~_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Table III.  Duration Models for Japan 
UNRESTRICTED WEIBULL  PROPORTIONAL WEIBULL 
____________________---_  ______________-_____---- 
Variable  Coefficient  T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 
_____----__  ___________  ----------_  ___________  ----------- 
















(PRIOR  EXP)~ 
-0.01655  -7.83994  .  .  . 
-0.03078  -3.98052 
0.06265  13.72791  .  .  . 
-0.38454  -2.74701 
0.29973  22.75554  0.42315 
Regression Function:  @IX 
3.48138  180.28103  3.50920 
0.00220  8.15649  0.00420 
0.00229  3.14376  0.00173 
-0.01876  -4.73448  -0.03531 
-0.00872  -0.49405  -0.06695 
0.14698  2.59038  0.15020 
0.03367  1.49714  -0.02286 
0.08170  3.26539  0.04989 
0.13007  1.99369  0.13616 
-0.00062  -5.59881  -0.00154 
-0.11492  -8.19260  -0.04178 
.  .  . 













23  0.61  0.60 
l-3 
Likelihood  -436.42  -610.97 
_~__-------_________~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ______________-_-_------ 
'IND is an indicator that equals 1 when the CEO has no prior 
experience to joining the firm, and equals 0 otherwise. .sm 
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